Some observers interpret the Supreme Religious Authority's non-intervention in the government formation crisis as a negative stance or a withdrawal from the public scene. However, this interpretation ignores the nature of the role that the Authority considers to be its inherent role, and overlooks the fact that the problem that exists today is not related to the scarcity of guidance, but rather to the scarcity of compliance with it.
The authority, represented by His Eminence Sayyid Ali al-Sistani (shadow of his shadow), has set from an early date the road for managing political affairs: respecting the constitution, arbitrating the public interest, and presenting the standards of efficiency and integrity at the expense of the logic of quotas and party loyalties. However, the political class treated these guidelines as a moral discourse for media consumption, not a practical commitment that alters patterns of behavior and the management of power.
The current political deadlock is not a sudden crisis, but a logical consequence of a long path of ignoring that compass.
Moreover, calling for the intervention of the Marjaiya in every crisis turns it, from an unintended point of view, into a compensatory party for the failure of the political elites, weakens the logic of constitutional responsibility, and establishes a culture of relying on rescue from the top, instead of holding political actors accountable for their failures.
Therefore, the reference's refraining from direct intervention at the present moment represents, in essence, an educational position as much as a political one: holding the actors responsible for their choices and their results.
In the calculations of the reference, the Iraqi scene is not read in isolation from the wider regional context. "The tension in the region dictates a prioritization, assessing the strategic risks to the Shia position in the region as a whole." And in this context, any direct threat to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is a threat of dimensions that go beyond the Iraqi arena, which may require a different approach in terms of the level of intervention and position.
However, the authority's refraining from interfering does not mean that it will completely distance itself from internal affairs. When the danger reaches a level that touches the constitution or threatens the country's stability and societal peace, intervention shifts from an exceptional option to a necessity imposed by national and moral responsibility.
It is important to distinguish between the forced interventions imposed by the post-2003 circumstances and the natural role of reference in the context of a State that is supposed to have institutions capable of managing its crises. Its intervention was a response to the collapse of the state and its weak institutional structure, rather than a permanent model for managing political life. Today, as His Eminence Sayyid Ali al-Sistani (may his shadow last) grows older, his deliberate reduction of the area of direct intervention can be understood as an effort to reposition the authority in its natural position as a supreme religious and moral authority, and to preserve its status from daily political consumption, as well as contributing to the creation of the general environment for the post-war phase (may God prolong his survival), in a way that alleviates the shocks of the transition and prevents the overloading of expectations on the nature and limits of the role of the authority that will succeed him.
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