"By Nannar Hawash, Senior Analyst, Syria and Jerome Drivon, Graduate Institute for International Studies and Development, Geneva"
Some 5,000 foreign fighters who helped overthrow the regime of former President Bashar al-Assad are still carrying weapons in Syria, posing an underlying problem for the interim government led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa. In the busy days following Assad's ouster in late 2024, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham -- the rebel faction that led the victorious offensive toward Damascus -- had only a few weeks to fill the security vacuum left by the regime's collapse.
Part of its solution was to integrate foreign fighters into its new armed forces. Most of these foreigners were initially attracted to Syria to join jihadist factions that were fighting the Assad regime alongside other rebels. Uyghurs from China make up about two-thirds of these, while the rest are non-Syrian Arabs, Central Asians, or Europeans.
This option seemed logical at the time; HTS was, in effect, employing non-Syrian militants to consolidate its rule and stabilize the country, while appeasing them with respectable positions in the post-Assad regime. And yet, it was unclear to many Syrians and outside observers alike whether these foreign fighters had been reined in or given free rein.
"The government's approach has raised concerns, both among Syrians fearful of a fundamentalist regime, and among international partners concerned that some within the ranks of foreign fighters have transnational agendas."
Many government critics see the decision to find meaningful work for the fighters as an indication of the intention to turn Syria into an authoritarian Islamic state. Events on the ground have deepened these fears; "During the 2025 wave of violence against Alawite civilians on the coast and Druze in Suwayda, foreign fighters were involved in incidents including murder, looting, destruction of property, and other acts aimed at humiliating the local population, though Syrians should be said to have committed the bulk of these abuses."
"Syria's external partners, for their part, have given the government -- (to a large extent) -- the freedom to manage the fighters' file as it sees fit, but that does not mean that their concerns have been completely dispelled." The United States, China, and other countries have signaled a willingness to forge ties with a government in Damascus that is effectively led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an armed group that broke away from al-Qaeda in 2016 to espouse a national Islamist agenda.
But many capitals remain wary of foreign fighters, with some still holding more radical aspirations and seeking to incite violence in their home countries. And officials from several Western and non-Western countries, particularly China, have made clear that government steps to ensure foreigners do not pose any threat will be an important factor in their assessment of the new Syrian leadership.
In the meantime, the 17 months since Assad's fall have dramatically changed the calculus for the Sharaa government. "The government has gained broad international recognition, and Damascus has extended its control over almost the entire country, including the country's formerly autonomous northeast, as it began integrating the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the central state apparatus."
Under these circumstances, the value of foreign fighters as a stabilizing force appears to have declined. But the authorities are in no hurry to release them, let alone ask them to leave Syria; State institutions fear that taking action against these groups could push individual fighters toward ISIS or other jihadist groups opposed to the post-Assad regime. Damascus sees little justification for risking destabilizing the current arrangements, in part because it sees the cost of keeping them low.
As a result, Damascus seems inclined to maintain the status quo of foreign fighters, at least for now. However, as Syria remains vulnerable to unrest, continuing to rely on these war-hardened fighters carries risks. "They may re-engage in sectarian violence, for example, or be recruited by ISIS." Some also run (or have influence over) schools and other educational facilities through which they can spread jihadist ideas. And Damascus should consider thoughtful reforms that limit these risks, while keeping the overall framework of the arrangements intact.
Why was the merger a logical choice?
"After seizing power in Damascus, HTS leadership faced the question of what to do with foreign fighters, whose role -- as members of diverse rebel groups during the long rebellion against Assad's rule -- contributed to its success." About two-thirds of the foreign fighters belong to the Turkestan Islamic Party, a Uighur militant group that also maintains a small presence in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.
The rest include hundreds of Uzbeks, Azeris, Chechens, Arabs and citizens of Western European countries. Several factions of their now disbanded factions are still designated as terrorist organizations by the UN Security Council and Western governments because of alleged links to al-Qaida. The same applies to some of their leaders, even after the Security Council removed HTS itself from the sanctions list at the end of February.
There was no easy solution to the new rulers' dilemma; "Deporting fighters was impractical, as most of their countries of origin refused to take them in or threatened to prosecute them under counterterrorism laws, and no third country offered them asylum." Disarming them by force was also unrealistic, as it risked provoking violent resistance or pushing fighters toward the cross-border jihad to which HTS had cut ties.
Moreover, parts of the new government's grassroots would have reacted angrily had it moved to sacrifice former comrades-in-arms. And yet, leaving thousands of fighters ready to fight out of state control raised the specter of undisciplined militias undermining Syria’s reconstruction efforts. Their poor economic prospects have made the transition to civilian life impossible.
And in thinking about this problem, HTS quickly settled on the same strategy it used in Idlib, the northwestern Syrian spot it controlled in the latter part of the civil war: containing foreign fighters while using them, when needed, in battles. By 2020, HTS had forced all other factions in Idlib to accept the authority of its "military operations room."
Under this arrangement, foreign fighters took part in the HTS-led fighting, but command decisions remained the preserve of HTS and other large Syrian factions, such as Ahrar al-Sham and Faylaq al-Sham, which were likewise part of the operations room. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ended up benefiting significantly from the prowess and enthusiasm of foreign fighters, including during the final campaign that brought down Assad.
And after December 2024, the new authorities expanded the scope of this model nationwide, with foreign fighters (and Syrian factions not affiliated with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham) choosing between two things: joining the new Syrian army and complying with its hierarchy; or face arrest (or worse) if they refuse to give up armed struggle independent of the military.
The new government said it will punish any militant who violates orders or endangers its foreign relations. Damascus has kept its promise; "Most non-HTS factions, whether Syrian or foreign, including the Turkestan Islamist Party, were integrated into the regular army after their dissolution." Opponents paid the price; In January 2025, authorities rushed to jail an Egyptian militant who had threatened Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, a sign that Syria would not be a platform to destabilize other countries.
A senior Syrian Interior Ministry official told the International Crisis Group that the authorities also took action against groups of foreign fighters that proved difficult to manage, imposing tight restrictions on a French group, confiscating their heavy weapons, and subjecting their camp to state control. Ansar al-Islam, a mostly Iraqi Kurdish group, formally disbanded in January 2025, but its members refused to integrate into the army, becoming targets for the U.S.-led international anti-ISIS coalition, whose airstrikes killed many of its leaders in September of that year.
Integration of Foreign Fighters... Sharaa's narrower goal is to consolidate his power among former rebels."
The integration of foreign fighters also served Sharia's more narrow purpose of consolidating its power among former rebels. "Some foreigners, such as members of the Turkestan Islamic Party, have a decade-long record of mostly smooth cooperation with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and, more importantly, their options are limited outside Syria." Hence, they represent a more reliable reserve of command than some former Syrian rebel factions, whose loyalty remains uncertain or untested.
To sum up, putting foreign fighters under the watchful eye of the state seemed safer than any of the other alternatives, and also seemed a step toward stabilizing post-Assad Syria and strengthening government authority.
practical model
"In applying the Idlib model on a national scale, the authorities have shown confidence in foreign fighters, especially since their nominal integration into the army has in many cases not yet amounted to full integration." "While all former rebel factions, both Syrian and non-Syrian, abandoned their own banners and wore military uniforms, many entered the new army as cohesive blocs, retaining their internal command structures."
For example, the TIP became three brigades of the newly formed 84th Division under the leadership of a leader from the same party. Similarly, smaller groups joined the army as newly established brigades within larger divisions, such as Ansar al-Tawhid, a mixed Syrian and foreign formation largely derived from the former Jund al-Aqsa organization, which entered the 82nd Division deployed on the coast.
Sharaa has also been given sensitive leadership roles to foreign leaders, and appears to have done so for a few reasons. "In predominantly foreign army units, such as the 84th Division, maintaining familiar commanders helped maintain internal cohesion and discipline." Other appointments reflect long records of fighting alongside Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib.
For example, the Jordanian Abd al-Rahman Hussein al-Khatib (known as Abu al-Hussein al-Jordanian), a central figure in integrating non-HTS factions into the new army, was appointed head of the Republican Guard, a Syrian formation that acts as a force to protect the regime from coups; He also appointed Omar Mohammed Jiftchi (known as Mukhtar al-Turki) as head of the Damascus Division charged with protecting the capital.
At the same time, foreign fighters seem to have accepted the Idlib model; Nearly all had already abandoned jihadist targets outside Syria when they were still in Idlib before Assad's fall. For TIP fighters, Syria appears to have become a priority, which has overshadowed their conflict with China.
They say that they accept the rule of the Sharia government and will abide by its laws and directives. Their children attend Syrian state schools and speak better Arabic than their mother tongue, while also attending community schools and cultural centers that teach Uyghur language and religious traditions. And their future seems to be moving toward integration into Syrian society, with some regard for Uyghur culture.
"So far, foreign fighters have largely complied with the government's military directives ... And to varying degrees.”
So far, foreign fighters have largely complied with the government's military directives as well, albeit to varying degrees. A senior Syrian Interior Ministry official told the International Crisis Group that most foreign fighter groups were manageable, calling the TIP "more disciplined, organized, and reliable" than others.
Indeed, the TIP is distinguished by its strong leadership and control; "For example, within 24 hours of Assad's fall, Hezbollah fighters withdrew from Damascus on direct orders from al-Sharaa." And when the new government directed armed groups to return property seized in Idlib to returning families displaced elsewhere in Syria, Hezbollah fighters immediately evacuated homes even in areas where they had been living since 2014 (when they first began arriving in Syria). And in return, some members of Syrian factions that are not affiliated with HTS and are backed by Turkey have challenged the same, staying in the homes of Kurds in Afrin that they occupied in 2018, and demanding thousands of dollars from returning families to reclaim their homes.
However, it turned out that controlling some groups was more difficult. The Interior Ministry official said in late April that Uzbek groups in particular "operate in disjointed, mafia-like ways that are difficult to control."
An incident in Idlib on 6 May confirmed his view: When security forces detained one Uzbek soldier who had been charged with unauthorized firing within the city limits, armed members of his unit surrounded the security forces headquarters to demand his release. Security forces only regained their authority days later, when sixteen Uzbek protesters were arrested in a campaign of raids that included neighboring towns.
External dimension
Foreign countries' reactions to Syria's integration of foreign fighters vary, but they have one thing in common: most view it with a strong dose of pragmatism, even as their concerns persist. And the terrorist designations that still exist have not prevented foreign governments and international bodies from engaging with the new Syrian authorities. In 2025, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United Nations all lifted sanctions against HTS and its leaders, as well as sanctions against Syria itself. Most seem to accept the idea that the government will rein in any former rebel group that goes off the line.
Still, not all of their fears were erased; Some of Syria's international partners fear that foreign fighters protected by the new state could use Syrian territory as a base for attacks abroad or for recruitment. Others object in principle to the incorporation of organizations and individuals designated as terrorists by the United Nations into the armed forces of a government recognized for the precedent this represents. A third option, shared by many Syrians, concerns schools, cultural centers, and religious institutions associated with foreign fighters, which could theoretically transfer jihadist ideas to a new generation. Idlib is home to about 30 Uyghur cultural centers that offer educational programs largely run outside state control, some of which are reported to integrate religious education with military training.
Perhaps a reflection of these uncertainties, governments have not always been fully consistent in how they deal with the foreign fighter dossier. The United States is one example; When President Donald Trump met with al-Sharaa in Riyadh in May 2025, he made getting all "foreign terrorists" out of Syria the second of five priorities, albeit without defining the term or setting a timeline.
But just a month later, Trump's envoy, Tom Barak, appeared to bless the formation of the 84th Division, made up almost entirely of TIP fighters, provided it was done "transparently." The administration thus seemed to suggest that integrating non-Syrian militants into the military was an acceptable temporary solution.
The U.S. Congress has taken a more skeptical stance; In December 2025, during the repeal of the 2019 Caesar Act, which imposed secondary sanctions on the Assad regime and its supporting entity, lawmakers introduced a requirement that the White House acknowledge every 180 days for four years that Damascus "is taking steps to remove foreign fighters from the Syrian government." The law does not have a Snapback mechanism — a method that allows lawmakers to reimpose sanctions if they find the Syrian government's efforts to be deficient — but it does expose Damascus to congressional oversight on the matter. It also provides frequent opportunities for critics to argue that the Syrian authorities have not fulfilled their obligations.
"China has been the latest to refrain from rehabilitating HTS and, until recently, was one of the major powers most critical of the integration of foreign fighters."
China was the last to refrain from rehabilitating HTS and, until recently, was one of the most critical major powers for integrating foreign fighters. For Beijing, the TIP is an extension of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which it sees as a separatist threat in China's Xinjiang region. And she was not satisfied when Damascus gave the party a place in its new security apparatus.
China indicated its unease with abstaining — a unilateral abstention it usually seeks to avoid — on UN Security Council Resolution 2799 on November 6, 2025, which lifted UN sanctions on al-Sharaa and Interior Minister Anas al-Khattab, though not on HTS as an organization.
And Syrian Foreign Minister Asad al-Shaibani visited Beijing in the same month, vowing that Syrian territory would not be used to threaten Chinese security, and opening negotiations that accelerated in early 2026. On February 27, after a month of talks in which Damascus provided guarantees to combat terrorism, China dropped its objection to the removal of HTS, and the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee unanimously removed HTS from the UN list, ending the organization's last multilateral terrorist designation.
Elsewhere, the weight given to this issue is different; "Among European countries, France and others have identified cooperation on foreign fighters as a priority in their dealings with Damascus, with little desire to take back their citizens." Russia, though its citizens make up a large portion of Syria’s foreign fighters, appears to have raised the issue as only a minor issue in counterterrorism talks.
Local objections
Many Syrians tend to have a less optimistic view of foreign fighters, and have been concerned to see them keep their weapons after taking Damascus. "For many secular Syrians, and for members of minority groups who have borne the brunt of the violence after the demise of the Assad regime, foreign fighters embody an authoritarian Islamist slip they fear under the Sharaa government." The new Syrian authorities have been slow to address these concerns, which are not unfounded.
There is a general concern that goes beyond the narrow issue of foreign fighters, and concerns the structure of the reconstituted security sector. The new armed forces rely heavily on individuals with backgrounds in rebel factions, both Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and others, who embraced aspects of jihadist ideology sometime before 2024. Tens of thousands of former fighters, both Syrian and foreign, have been absorbed into the rapidly expanding security sector, with only limited vetting.
Since then, former fighters, including members of militant factions, have been dispersed through a security apparatus that spans the country below the level of oversight that HTS had in Idlib. As a Syrian counterterrorism officer told the International Crisis Group, foreign fighters are often more disciplined than Syrians because they have nowhere else to go.
Experience has already shown that it is difficult to tell whether a particular person has given up on jihadist ideas or is still holding onto them. In the Palmyra offensive in December 2025, three U.S. military personnel working alongside Syrian government forces were killed by a Syrian national security service member with suspected ISIS links. The incident showed the dangers that can arise when members of a security apparatus built in large part from fighters of rebel factions rebel. The attack came a month after al-Sharaa signed a cooperation agreement at the White House, sparking a debate in Washington about the dangers of patrolling alongside Syrian government forces.
The intensified recruitment campaign by ISIS since the fall of Assad increases these risks; The group portrays Shari'a's pragmatic rule and Syria's participation in the anti-ISIS coalition as apostasy. And while it is not clear how resonant this message has been with the new Syrian soldiers, it has sown fears of infiltration of state institutions, the defection of fighters integrated into the army and their joining ISIS, and lone wolf attacks.
And the odds of defecting and joining ISIS may increase if Damascus appears to be cracking down on foreign fighters or handing them over to governments that are likely to treat them harshly. ISIS's small-scale attacks do not pose a threat to Sharia rule, but the symbolic dimension is important: while the Syrian-Syrian fighting and violence emanating from foreign fighters are remnants of the civil war, the latter carries a much larger political charge; It feeds the politically toxic argument that the new Syrian leadership distinguishes its wartime jihadist allies at the expense of the security of ordinary citizens.
Indeed, foreign fighters have been involved in acts of violence against Syrian civilians; "The involvement of foreign fighters in quelling a pro-Assad rebellion on the coast in March 2025, as well as the Druze uprising in Suwayda in July of that year, starkly highlighted the problem of integration into the armed forces." And while Syrians have committed most atrocities, the UN Commission of Inquiry has documented the involvement of foreign fighters in abuses against Alawite civilians on the coast and Druze civilians in Suwayda. The bottom line for many Syrians was that the transitional authorities had not yet completely severed their connection to their jihadi and sectarian past.
The army's discipline has improved since then, as demonstrated in January when Damascus took control of formerly SDF-held areas in Aleppo and the northeast of the country with far less harm to civilians, but perceptions persist of the military as an undisciplined mass of elements with a grudge toward religious minorities.
A better way to manage fighters
"Damascus has limited options for dealing with foreign fighters, and for now has little incentive to change its approach given the stability it appears to have fostered." However, the status quo carries risks; "Incidents involving foreign fighters, if repeated, would likely carry enormous symbolic weight, fueling fears of Islamist drift among many Syrians while giving critics abroad reason to question the trajectory of the post-Assad transition."
The participation of foreign fighters in violent events highlights the flaws in the current model of integration. And other capitals, particularly Washington, Beijing, and European capitals, should continue to urge the Syrian government to adopt measures that reduce the risk of defections or security threats involving these fighters without undermining the framework that has, so far, succeeded in keeping them largely under control.
"Damascus should distinguish between leadership roles that serve military effectiveness and those based solely on loyalty."
Precisely because of the improved security situation, Damascus now has room to take cautious steps. First, they should distinguish between leadership roles that serve military effectiveness and those based solely on loyalty. The retention of foreign commanders in predominantly foreign units such as the 84th Division can be justified for operational reasons, but in predominantly Syrian and particularly sensitive units, such as the Damascus Division or positions within the General Staff, foreigners should ultimately be replaced by reliable Syrians. Non-Syrians could instead be reassigned to operational roles within predominantly foreign units, where their standing among the fighters remains an advantage and does not cause the consequences that come from leading Syrian personnel.
Second, the authorities should take additional measures to ensure that Syrian territory is not used to plan operations outside the country, for example by expanding channels of communication for counterterrorism-related inquiries from abroad. And it should continue to crack down on individual fighters, foreign or Syrian, who break the rules.
Third, to address concerns about the spread of jihadist ideology to a new generation, Damascus could subject civilian institutions associated with foreign fighters to direct state oversight. The transfer of TIP-run schools and cultural centers to the Ministry of Education and other appropriate state institutions, with the requirement to harmonize curricula and remove components of military training, would extend state authority while preserving the community life of Uyghur families in Syria. Party leaders have shown a willingness to propel such an arrangement. The government's push to standardize curricula across Syria already provides an institutional framework for such a move.
"Fourth, Damascus could reform the nationality law to allow Syrian women to grant citizenship to their foreign spouses and children, a right currently reserved for men." This reform would address the long-standing problem of gender discrimination. As a by-product, it would also open a legal pathway for naturalizing the large number of foreign fighters who have married Syrian women, or at least their children, provided they are subject to proper vetting and demobilization (except for those already integrated into the military, who would still face vetting but whose ongoing service replaces demobilization). This approach carries far fewer risks of angering the public than the distribution of passports as a reward for wartime service.
In the longer term, the authorities should gradually reduce foreign military formations and integrate personnel into mixed units as security continues to improve, with the subsequent goal being broader demobilization or civilian reintegration. And with incremental steps by Damascus and measured expectations from its partners, the issue of foreign fighters should not become a major obstacle to Syria’s broader international re-engagement.
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