U.S. policymakers and South Korean (ROK) leaders have recently shown increasing openness to replacing the Armistice Agreement signed 72 years ago with a negotiated peace treaty that formally ends the Korean War. However, this goal raises strategic questions: would peace promote stability, or would it generate instability and strategic risks to U.S. interests and the regional order?
It is true that truces stop fighting and treaties formally end conflict, but history suggests that hasty settlements can create instability in a region. Hence the dilemma of how to ensure that the next US peace campaign does not repeat the mistakes of previous military withdrawals that opened the way for aggression and reshaped the regional balance of power to the detriment of America and its allies.
The price of peace: The Dangers of Deterrence and Delaying Nuclear Disarmament
The 1953 Armistice Agreement stopped fighting after three years of war, but it kept East Asia in a state of suspended animosity, with communist-backed North Korea facing off against US-backed South Korea on both sides of the military demarcation line. During this period, the United States maintained stability via extensive security guarantees and a direct military presence that served as a "deterrent" to any large-scale U.S. intervention if conflict erupted.
But peace may carry with it the risk of a reduced foreign military presence, weakening deterrence and opening the door to setbacks unless a strong and independent allied defense capability is built. Secondary consequences of peace include: Normalization of U.S.-North Korean relations, diminished justification for foreign military presence on the peninsula, loss of U.N. rear bases in Japan, and growing doubts about U.S. credibility and ability to intervene in a costly Korean conflict in the future.
All of this could be interpreted by allies and rivals as a signal of U.S. withdrawal, increasing the likelihood of North Korea blackmailing, breaking the deal, or adopting expansionist regional strategies.
The introduction of thorny issues such as denuclearization or reunification complicates negotiations. Success may force the abandonment of entrenched U.S. policies that have derailed previous negotiations. Signs of this came when Trump administration officials described North Korea as a "nuclear power" in 2024 and 2025, while Kim Jong-un's visit to China in September 2025 reportedly included a precondition for dropping the denuclearization demand, reflecting Beijing's support for radical peace negotiations.
But postponing this issue until after the deal would leave North Korea's nuclear arsenal intact, exacerbating security risks in South Korea and Japan.
History warnings
History is replete with lessons about the dangers of early withdrawals and fragile agreements. Before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Washington scaled back its presence on the peninsula to focus on Europe and withdrew its troops from South Korea by late 1949, encouraging the North, backed by China and the Soviet Union, to invade and nearly overthrow the South but for heavy U.S. intervention.
In Vietnam, the 1973 Paris Peace Accord led to a rapid American withdrawal, leaving the South vulnerable to the Communist North, which broke the agreement and took control of the country in 1975.
These precedents suggest that a fragile peace and hasty withdrawal reinforce aggression and undermine allies. A Korean peace treaty that dissolves the UNC, reduces U.S. forces, and transfers operational control to the South could leave it vulnerable to threats from communist states. Despite its traditional superiority, South Korea suffers from a nuclear gap and demographic and economic pressures to modernize its military, raising doubts about its ability to close the deterrence gap without Washington.
Opposite opinion: Capitalizing on regional allies
However, there are successful precedents. Following Trump's withdrawal from Syria in 2019, Turkey quickly took over security duties by deploying 20,000 troops in northern Syria, preventing a strategic vacuum that Iran or Russia could exploit.
Applying this lesson on the Korean Peninsula requires a measured U.S. withdrawal, not so fast as to encourage aggression, nor so slow as to foster allied overdependence.
The question remains: can South Korea and Japan expand their security roles and cooperation despite historical and economic differences?
Regional risks
A peace treaty would reshape Northeast Asia's alliances. The loss of Washington and UN assets could push South Korea partially into the arms of Beijing, while Japan may accelerate rearmament to counter the risks of US withdrawal and Chinese ascendancy. This deepens historical divisions rather than fosters cooperation.
China may exploit these cracks to draw the two Koreas into its sphere of influence, weaken the U.S. presence, and isolate Japan.
Political priorities
The United States needs to carefully manage the post-peace phase to avoid the mistakes of the past: A quick withdrawal that opens the door to competitors, or a slow withdrawal that reinforces dependency and hinders Washington's priorities in deterring China.
Advanced U.S. capabilities (long-range strikes, artificial intelligence, logistics capabilities) should be linked to increased allied spending and burden sharing. Japan should be empowered as a regional stabilizer, and trilateral cooperation (Washington-Seoul-Tokyo) should be strengthened.
At the same time, limited engagement with Pyongyang may be an option to reduce China's influence, provided existing alliances are not undermined.
Trump factor
A Korean peace treaty would be a historic event, ending America's longest war and reshaping East Asian security. But Trump has shown a penchant for making unconventional strategic decisions, whether in his frequent meetings with Kim Jong-un, his withdrawal from Syria, or his attempt to push for a peace deal in Ukraine despite the risks to European security.
The Ukraine experience could be a model for the approach to Korean peace, with lessons about the balance of speed and caution.
Conclusion
Peace does not necessarily mean stability. The success of a Korean peace treaty requires balancing U.S. withdrawal with enhanced regional deterrence through advanced technologies and allies willing to share the security burden. Without strong deterrence, the agreement could turn out to be a prelude to new chaos in Northeast Asia, capitalizing on the rise of China and North Korea.
Glenn Schofield, retired U.S. Air Force analyst
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