Prepared by: Dr. Hossam Abdel Abbas Al-Rubaie
summary
This paper examines how international financial compliance requirements, from anti-money laundering to dollar restrictions, have turned into a stressor on the Iraqi economy, and argues that fragility stems not from compliance itself but from an economic structure that makes oil revenue, dollar liquidity, and the banking system dependent on external channels. The paper proceeds from the literature of armed interdependence and the impact of the International Classification on financial flows, and is based in the data on the Mutual Assessment Report for Iraq and the data of the Financial Action Task Force and the documents of the Central Bank of Iraq, then presents the government and banking response and assess its limits, and proposes a path based on completing the reform of banks transparently and implementing the plan of the Financial Action Task Force and reducing dependence on dollar cash and providing data that allows to measure impact scientifically.
Keywords: financial sovereignty, compliance, sanctions, dollar, banking system, central bank of Iraq, financial working group, armed interdependence.
First: Introduction, Problem and Methodology of Sources
The term "compliance pressure" is used in this paper to denote the cumulative effect of AML/CFT standards, sanctions enforcement and correspondent bank examinations on the ability of Iraqi banks to transact in dollars. This file is often read purely politically, but it has an equally important technical aspect: the global financial system requires every bank it deals with documented evidence of the safety of the money it passes, and whoever does not provide this evidence is excluded from the messaging channels whatever their reasons. And the sensitivity of the issue in Iraq is increasing because oil covered 88% of federal revenues in 2025[23], and because the revenues from its sale enter an account with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from which Iraq withdraws what finances salaries and imports[22].
The paper proceeds from a specific thesis: sovereign financial fragility in Iraq is not the result of compliance per se, but of an economic structure that links revenue, dollar liquidity, and the banking system to external channels that Iraq does not have the full keys to. And so the government response, when it shifts from reactive to institutional building, is able to shift compliance from an imposed constraint to a balance of trust that expands the margin of movement. And what is the structure of fragility in Iraq as the preliminary data show? And what did the government and the central bank do? And what is missing to complete the course?
The paper has been adopted progressively in sources: peer-reviewed studies and research working papers of international institutions first, then official documents and international standards (mutual assessment report, FATF data and central bank documents), then specialized press exclusively for recent facts on which a preliminary document has not yet been issued. The journalistic sources in the bibliography were labeled with a separate category so that the reader could distinguish them.
Second: Theoretical Framework and Literature
The dissertation "Armed Interdependence" provides a framework for understanding this type of stress. According to Farrell and Neumann, global financial and information networks are asymmetrically established, with connections concentrated in a few decades, and a state with effective jurisdiction over these contracts and appropriate domestic institutions can employ this structural advantage in coercion through two mechanisms: the "control effect" that enables the collection of strategically valuable information, and the "throttling effect" that enables the denial of access to the network to adversaries.[1] In the researcher's reading, the New York Federal Reserve Bank's oil revenue account[22] represents a choke point in the Iraqi case, and the obligation of importers to provide details of goods and the ultimate beneficiary[20] is a monitoring tool.
Empirical literature that measures the impact of compliance and international classification on financial flows is branched out from this framework, and does not pool its results in one direction. Colin, Cook, and Suramaki found, using SWIFT data, that countries added to the gray list experienced a decline of up to 10% in the number of incoming payments without a change in the number of outgoing payments, with limited evidence of this impact shifting to trade.[3] Keda and Pitzold estimated in an IMF working paper that the rating reduces capital inflows by an average of 7.6% of GDP, of which 3.0% is for foreign direct investment, 2.9% for portfolio investment, and 3.6% for other investments.[2] In a recent Inter-American Development Bank working paper, banking and capital inflows decline by between 1.3% and 2.6% of quarterly output at listing, and the country after write-off recovers only 40% to 70% of the decline, consistent with continued frictions in correspondent banking relationships.[4] Case-Roshala and Nance, in work in progress, argue that the lists have an impact on flows, noting that the introduction of more comprehensive data removes the impact observed by previous studies on cross-border banking liabilities[5], while an editorial in the Journal of Money Laundering Control in 2024 called for a review of the gray list approach[6].
The banking messaging literature explains how compliance procedures can turn into a tangible effect. The International Monetary Fund concluded that cross-border payments remained stable overall despite a slight decline in the number of correspondent relationships, but that financial fragility worsened in a limited number of countries whose flows are concentrated through fewer relationships or through alternative arrangements, and that this may raise the cost of financial services, harm bank ratings, and undermine prospects for growth and financial inclusion.[15] The Financial Action Task Force itself states in its statement on countries under enhanced surveillance that it does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence procedures towards these countries, and that its standards do not envisage "ending the relationship" with entire categories of customers but rather call for a risk-based approach.[13] The gap between this official text and the behavior of correspondent banks is what the studies are trying to measure.
And at the Iraqi level, local and international studies deal with the window of selling the currency and the electronic platform and the difference between the two prices. Tabaqgli pointed out that the Central Bank's introduction of the extended disclosure requirement for the beneficiary in external dollar transfers in November 2022 was followed by an imbalance between the supply of the dollar and the demand for it, and that a similar pattern was repeated in August 2023, when the difference between the two prices widened from about 13%.[7] A recent study in the Diponegoro Journal of Economics finds that between 2021 and 2024, the central bank replaced the traditional currency auction with an electronic platform governed by compliance and consistent with SWIFT protocols and anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing requirements, and that the widening of the price difference in 2023 was the result of "institutional friction" in the early operational design of the platform rather than a deterioration in macroeconomic fundamentals.[8] Reporting suspicious transactions in Iraq based on the 2016–2024 AMLO reports and the Mutual Assessment Report[9]. The literature of the rentier state adds a structural background, as the rentier economy receives its income from abroad and the state distributes it, so the channels through which this income passes are vulnerable.[10][11]
These literature converge on a conclusion that serves the paper's thesis: that the impact of compliance is neither inevitable nor uniform, and that it depends on the quality of institutional design, the clarity of communication, and the ability of the state to provide vetted evidence. This paper adds the reading of the Iraqi situation as a situation in which three episodes of fragility (revenue, cash and banks) intersect, and a government and banking response is triggered based on standards and independent scrutiny, a collection that has not yet been addressed in the literature mentioned.
Third: Fragility Structure
The first is the revenue cycle. Oil covered 88% of federal revenues in 2025[23], and each dollar passes through the New York account[22]. 2026 showed what that means in practice, as trade routes and crude exports through the Strait of Hormuz were disrupted by regional turmoil.[20]
The second episode is the Money and Banks episode, for which international documents provide preliminary figures. According to the Mutual Assessment of Iraq report, the banking sector represents about 96.2% of the assets of the formal financial sector, and the number of banks operating in 2022 reached 76 banks, including seven government banks, and their assets amounted to about $128 billion, or 61.8% of GDP, and the monetary economy was estimated at about 42% of output in 2017, or about $73 billion.[12] The rate of financial inclusion increased from 20.8% in 2017 to 33.5% in 2021, equivalent to 14.57 million adults with accounts.[12] Other estimates vary, as a press report finds that the three major government banks control about 85% of the sector's assets.[30]
And the report points out that the restrictions on the exchange of the dinar and the implementation of foreign transfers, as the dollar is available only through the central bank and for commercial purposes only, have produced an alternative system of exchange through unlicensed companies that also work in remittances, and that the speed of those companies and their low cost prompted the perpetrators to resort increasingly to the informal sector.[12] This explains why any tightening of dollar controls, whatever its justification, turns into pressure on liquidity and on official channels at the same time.
And the fragility is reflected in the indicators of 2026. The central bank's foreign currency reserves amounted to $91 billion at the end of May, a decline of 6.3% since the end of 2025, or about $6 billion, according to the researcher's calculation, and the gap between the official rate of the dinar (about 1,310 dinars to the dollar) and the parallel rate (about 1,550), or about 18%, and annual inflation rose from 2.2% in March to 4.3% in April, according to data from the Central Bank, as quoted by The National.[20] The monthly US cash flows are estimated at about $1 billion, supporting the stability of the exchange rate.[31] Estimates of the number of banks restricted from dealing in dollars: 28 banks in the last published list of the Central Bank on February 23 2026[25], and more than 30 banks according to other reports[30]. Restricted banks are allowed to continue operating in other currencies, but the restriction disrupts most of their overseas operations.[24]
And the three rings feed off each other: revenue disruption squeezes liquidity, weak bank confidence drives savings into cash, and cash depends on the safety of the banks that pass it. And it is precisely here that the question of compliance is transformed from a technical matter into a sovereign one.
Fourth: Compliance in Iraq between International Assessment and Bilateral Pressure
International documents assess the effectiveness of Iraq's anti-money-laundering system differently. The MENA FATF Mutual Assessment Report (field visit in August 2023, report in May 2024) gave a "low" level of effectiveness in investigating and prosecuting money laundering and the effectiveness of targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation financing, a "moderate" level of seven direct outcomes, including risk assessment, oversight and preventive measures, and a "high" level of international cooperation and confiscation of funds.[12] The report notes that banks understand their risks and obligations well and that central bank licensing controls prevent offenders from controlling financial institutions, but notes the poor quality of suspicious transaction reports, delayed circulation of sanctions lists, and inadequate enforcement of sanctions related to proliferation financing.[12]
And on June 19, 2026, the FATF added Iraq to its list of countries subject to enhanced surveillance.[14] In its statement, it acknowledges that since the adoption of its report in November 2024, Iraq has made progress that includes market access controls, guidance for non-bank financial institutions and specific non-financial businesses and professions, measures to mitigate real estate sector risks and improve understanding of the misuse of legal persons, and outlines a nine-item action plan that includes improving monitoring of informal money transfers, developing a legislative framework for virtual asset service providers, applying targeted financial sanctions and measures for politically exposed persons, increasing the quality and number of suspicious transaction reports, increasing the pace of investigations and prosecutions, and enhancing the ability to detect proliferation financing sanctions evasion.[13]
It is important to distinguish between two paths that are often confused. The gray list is a multilateral resolution that does not call for enhanced due diligence measures, according to the group's text.[13] The dollar restrictions on certain Iraqi banks are a bilateral measure that passes through the settlement node that the thesis of armed interdependence talks about[1]: the US Treasury's audit of the sector began in late 2022[20], and the Central Bank banned in 2024 eight banks from dealing in dollars and then another five in February 2025 after meetings with the Treasury and the Federal Reserve in Dubai.[24] The Treasury in July 2026, for the first time, set a detailed path for the return of the restricted banks.[21] This distinction is necessary to read the literature: the results of the gray list studies do not automatically transfer to the state of dollar restrictions.
Fifth: Government and banking response
The Iraqi response did not begin in 2026. According to the Mutual Assessment Report, the AML/CFT Office was established within the Central Bank under the 2015 law, the first national risk assessment was completed in October 2022 and approved by the Council of Ministers in January 2023, and the Central Bank in 2023 issued new customer due diligence instructions that include financial institutions, businesses, and non-financial professions, and the disclosure of the real beneficiary list was issued, and Iraq joined the Egmont Group in 2023, and a third national strategy was developed for the period 2023–2027[12] Localization of salaries, activation of electronic collection, licensing of electronic payment providers, and exemption of payment devices from fees[12].
And in controlling the dollar, between 2021 and 2024, the central bank replaced the currency auction with an electronic platform consistent with SWIFT protocols and anti-money laundering requirements[8], requiring importers to provide details of the goods and the final beneficiary and activated the electronic payment system.[20] The government has borne the price of the move with temporary friction in the market, studies see[7][8], but has in return obtained traceable flows, the raw material for any compliance evidence. The EBRD states that these efforts contributed to stabilizing the exchange rate, strengthening anti-money laundering controls, and launching a cross-border payments platform, and that in June 2025, the Central Bank launched the National Strategy for Financial Inclusion 2025–2029.[17] In September 2026, the current government announced steps to tighten control over the distribution of the dollar, regulate the use of foreign currency, reduce abuse of the financial system, and expand electronic payments.[29]
And in the banking sector, the Central Bank announced on April 7, 2025, with government support and in cooperation with Oliver Wyman, a plan for private sector reform that commits banks to solvency, liquidity, governance and compliance standards and evaluates them in stages.[18] The plan allows each bank three tracks (continuation, merger or exit), and the Central Bank announced in February 2026 the completion of its main phase after all banks submitted minimum requirements documents.[27] The first cycle of the assessment, which runs from April 1 to September 30, 2026, requires banks wishing to continue with a paid-up capital of at least 300 billion dinars, a capital adequacy of at least 12.5%, and liquidity coverage and net stable financing ratios of at least each 100%, independent assessments by Central Bank-approved auditors of the Bank's compliance with AML/Sanctions, internal control and related parties, IFRS 9 audited financial statements, participation in the deposit protection system, and a property mitigation plan. The course ends with either the bank succeeding or giving it six months to address the loopholes, and may divert those who fail to the merger or exit path.[19] The seriousness of the procedure was that the governor at the time stated that ten banks were in liquidation for their inability to refund depositors.[26]
And in government banks, the government appointed Ernst & Young to restructure six of the seven state banks, with a plan to transform Rafidain Bank into "First Rafidain" with less than 24% government participation.[28] In February 2025, the authorities announced a plan to reform government banks, modernize the private sector, raise transparency standards, and introduce new liquidity and capital requirements to protect depositors.[17] The International Monetary Fund considers reforming government banks a condition for supporting the private sector.[16]
And on the leadership front, in June 2026, Nizar Nasser Hussein, a banker who spent more than 25 years at the bank and held his last position as Director General of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Office, took over the presidency of the Central Bank in June 2026, a choice that indicates the priority of compliance in the monetary agenda, and one of his tasks is to coordinate with the Ministry of Finance, the judiciary and banks to implement the FATF plan.[20] The government also sought to diversify the channels of settlement, and in February 2026, the Central Bank allowed banks that meet its standards to resume cross-border transactions and open documentary credits in currencies, including the euro, the UAE dirham, the Chinese yuan, and the Jordanian dinar.[27]
These facts demonstrate a shift in the nature of the response, from situational administrative procedures to a system based on standards, independent scrutiny and defined pathways. And most importantly, outside auditors have become party to the proof of compliance, making it a testable proof rather than a mere declaration.
Sixth: Response Limits
However, the picture is not complete without looking at what has not yet been achieved. The U.S. Treasury Department has made it clear that the path is two-stage: first, banks meet governance and compliance requirements to be returned to non-dollar messaging channels, and second, they complete the reform and licensing process, including independent auditing of the compliance function, finding a qualified investor, and meeting international efficiency and suitability standards, only then they are allowed to deal in dollars. Analysts felt that the process would take years, not months, and that its success depended on consistent and impartial enforcement of the rules.[21]
And while an IMF study estimates a decline in inflows of an average of 7.6% of output[2], other work questions the impact[5], and the work of the Development Bank shows that the recovery after delisting is partial.[4] The risks in the literature, from the high cost of correspondence and the concentration of inflows in fewer relationships,[15] should be monitored in the Iraqi case rather than assumed. This calls for data on messaging relationships and the cost of transfers to be made available to local researchers to measure the impact.
Macro indicators are also under pressure, with declining reserves and a wide price gap[20], and the banking sector remains dominated by government banks and weak lending, with little credit flowing.[30]
Potential pathways to 2028
This paper does not claim to be a digital prediction, but it does distinguish three possible pathways through 2028 depending on the extent of implementation of the above. In the first track, completion, banks wishing to continue through the first cycle and implement the terms of the action plan on time, and Iraq is removed from the gray list, and qualified banks gradually return to the channels of correspondence in non-dollars and then in dollars. In the second track, partial progress, some banks succeed and others falter, and compliance pressure remains to a lesser degree as reliance on cash shipments continues. In the third track, stumbling, exceptions strip reform standards of substance and restrictions worsen.
And the trend can be monitored by five indicators: the number of banks that pass the first cycle and return to external channels, the extent to which the FATF plan items are completed, the gap between the official and parallel prices, the balance of reserves, and the share of electronic payments in transactions.
VIII. Recommendations
Based on the above, the paper suggests the following. First, the publication of the results of the first cycle of evaluation (success or omission) in a regular and transparent manner, as accurate disclosure enhances the credibility of correspondent banks. Second, establish an announced timetable for the FATF's work plan and form a permanent coordination committee comprising the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance, the judiciary, and the supervisory authorities, with quarterly indicators of achievement. Thirdly, quality control for certified auditors, as the entire system is based on the reliability of their reports, and it is proposed to establish a public record of their names and subject them to periodic quality checks.
Fourth, reducing the need for dollar cash by localizing salaries and government payments in bank accounts and electronic payment instruments and expanding their acceptance. Fifth, complete the restructuring of government banks, in particular the "Rafidain I" project, with an announced timetable. Sixth, the channels for settlement in multiple currencies should be expanded in a disciplined manner, with a long-term examination of options for reserve-keeping arrangements and settlement in a legal framework and calculated risks, not as a substitute for but as a hedge against the dollar system. Seventh, standardize the official discourse on compliance updates so that each understanding is announced after it has been documented. Eighth, providing aggregated data for scientific research, including correspondence relations and the volume of external transfers through the electronic platform, and funding independent pilot studies, because the international literature does not determine the impact of compliance and classification, and cannot be resolved in the Iraqi case without data.
Ninth: Conclusion
Literature and documentation reveal that Iraq's sovereign fiscal fragility is real but not destiny. It is the fruit of a structure that makes revenue, cash, and banks dependent on external channels, and it is treatable insofar as government actions shift from advertisements to audited standards. And the government and the central bank have made substantial steps in building the compliance system, reforming banks, and assigning the leadership of the central bank to a specialist in compliance and diversifying settlement channels, but its real test is continuity and equal enforcement, and its ability to prove to the world, with audited evidence and not data, that its banks deserve trust. Whoever has clean books has a wider margin for negotiation.
Margins and references
First: Academic Studies and Research Worksheets
Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42–79. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/730804
[2] Kida, M., & Paetzold, S. (2021). The impact of gray-listing on capital flows: An analysis using machine learning (IMF Working Paper No. 2021/153). International Monetary Fund https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513582436.001
Collin, M., Cook, S., & Soramäki, K. (2016). The impact of anti-money laundering regulation on payment flows: Evidence from SWIFT data (CGD Working Paper 445). Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/impact-anti-money-laundering-SWIFT-data
[4] Lagarda, G., & Verastegui Lira, P. (2026). Do warnings change behavior? Money-laundering, grey-listing by the FATF, and cross-border financial flows (IDB Working Paper No. IDB-WP-01823). Inter-American Development Bank. https://doi.org/10.18235/0014029
Case-Ruchala, D., & Nance, M. (2024). FATF blacklists don't work the way you think they do [Work in progress; paper presented at the 2nd Annual Empirical Anti-Money Laundering Conference]. https://bahamasamlconference.centralbankbahamas.com/documents/2024-03-26-16-02-18-FATF-Blacklists-Dont-Work-the-Way-You-Think-They-Do-Case-Ruchala-and-Nance.pdf
[6] Editorial: FATF greylisting: Time to revisit the approach. (2024). Journal of Money Laundering Control. https://doi.org/10.1108/JMLC-07-2024-206
[7] Tabaqchali, A. (2023, August 15). The dinar and the conundrum over the dollar and Iran. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2023/08/15/the-dinar-and-the-conundrum-over-the-dollar-and-iran
[8] Sulaiman, A., Yousif, A., & Marof, M. (2026). The effectiveness of the electronic platform of the Central Bank of Iraq in controlling the parallel exchange rate: An econometric study for the period 2021–2024. Journal of Economics, 15(1). https://ejournal3.undip.ac.id/index.php/jme/article/view/57324
[9] Dahash, Q. H. (2025). How effective are suspicious transaction reporting system in Iraq? Journal of Legal Science (University of Baghdad), 40(2). https://www.jols.uobaghdad.edu.iq/index.php/jols/article/view/1190
Mahdavy, H. (1970). The patterns and problems of economic development in rentier states: The case of Iran. In M. A. Cook (Ed.), Studies in the economic history of the Middle East (pp. 428–467). Oxford University Press.
Beblawi, H., & Luciani, G. (Eds.). (1987). The rentier state. Croom Helm.
II. Official documents and international standards
[12] Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force [MENAFATF]. (2024, May). Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: The Republic of Iraq — Mutual evaluation report. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/MER-Iraq-2024.html
[13] Financial Action Task Force [FATF]. (2026, June 19). Jurisdictions under increased monitoring — 19 June 2026. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html
[14] Financial Action Task Force [FATF]. (2026, June 19). Outcomes FATF Plenary, 17–19 June 2026. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/outcomes-fatf-plenary-june-2026.html
[15] International Monetary Fund [IMF]. (2017, April 21). Recent trends in correspondent banking relationships: Further considerations (Policy paper). https://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2017/04/21/recent-trends-in-correspondent-banking-relationships-further-considerations
[16] International Monetary Fund [IMF]. (2025, July). Iraq: 2025 Article IV consultation (IMF Country Report No. 25/183). https://www.imf.org/en/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1irqea2025001-source-pdf.pdf
[17] European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD]. (2025). Transition report 2025-26: Country assessment — Iraq. https://www.ebrd.com/content/dam/ebrd_dxp/assets/pdfs/office-of-the-chief-economist/transition-report-archive/transition-report-2025/country-assessments/Southern-&-Eastern-Mediterranean/transition-report-2025-26-CA-Iraq.pdf
[18] Central Bank of Iraq (2025, April 7). A comprehensive reform project for the private banking sector [Press release]. https://cbi.iq/news/view/2839
[19] Central Bank of Iraq (2026, March). Cycle 1 assessment guidelines: Applicable to banks that have selected the Stay Pathway. https://cbi.iq/static/uploads/up/file-177615476754417.pdf
Third: Press Sources
[20] The National (2026, June 22). Iraq appoints new central bank governor amid financial strain and push for reform. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/06/22/iraq-appoints-new-central-bank-governor-amid-financial-strain-and-push-for-reform/
[21] The National (2026, July 22). US Treasury signals years-long plan to rebuild Iraq banking sector. https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/banking/2026/07/22/us-treasury-signals-years-long-plan-to-rebuild-iraq-banking-sector/
[22] Al Jazeera. (2026, April 22). US halts shipment of Iraq's oil dollars to curb Iran-linked groups: WSJ. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/22/us-halts-iraq-dollar-shipments-in-pressure-campaign-over-iran-linked-groups
[23] Shafaq News (2026, March 4). 88% of Iraq's 2025 budget. https://shafaq.com/en/Economy/Oil-revenues-anchor-88-of-Iraq-s-2025-budget
[24] The Arab Weekly (2025, February 17). Iraq to ban five local banks from engaging in US dollar transactions. https://thearabweekly.com/iraq-ban-five-local-banks-engaging-us-dollar-transactions
[25] Peregraf. (2026, July 18). Iraqi PM announces seven banks cleared under US Treasury understanding. https://peregraf.com/index.php/en/news/12039
[26] AGBI. (2025, August 13). Iraq shuts 10 banks in restructuring scheme. https://www.agbi.com/banking-finance/2025/08/iraq-shuts-10-banks-in-restructuring-scheme
[27] Iraq Business News (2026, February 26). Central Bank advances Iraqi banking reform, eases foreign transactions. https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2026/02/26/central-bank-advances-iraqi-banking-reform-eases-foreign-transactions/
[28] Iraq Business News (2025, June 7). Iraq announces major banking sector overhaul. https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2025/06/07/iraq-announces-major-banking-sector-overhaul/
[29] Jerusalem Post. (2026, September 26). Iraq says US agrees to continue dollar cash shipments. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-909933
[30] Enterprise. (2026, July 1). Iraq banking reform: A push to fix a system where credit barely flows. https://enterpriseam.com/menaplus/2026/07/01/iraq-banking-reform-a-push-to-fix-a-system-where-credit-barely-flows/
[31] The New Arab (2026, July 2). After suspension, US resumes dollar shipments to Iraq. https://www.newarab.com/news/after-suspension-us-resumes-dollar-shipments-iraq
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